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namely Cape Verde, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal. This increase in imports from the EU would be accompanied by a 2.4–5.6 
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losses may be manageable because of several mitigating factors, in particular the likelihood of product exclusions, the length of 
the agreement’s implementation period and the scope for reform of exemptions regime. The large country-by-country differences 
in fiscal revenue loss suggest that domestic tax reforms and fiscal transfers within ECOWAS could be important complements to 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) promotes regional 
political co-operation and economic integration with the aim of eventually establishing an 
economic union among West African countries. The treaty establishing the ECOWAS was 
signed in Lagos, Nigeria on 28 May 1975 and came into force on 20 June 1975. After having 
celebrated its 30
th anniversary, ECOWAS is now faced with the daunting challenge of how to 
move forward with regional economic integration while at the same time negotiating a major 
redesign of its trading relationship with the European Union (EU). 
Throughout its existence, ECOWAS’ commercial relations with the EU have been 
framed by the trade policy understandings contained in the partnership agreements that the EU 
has entered into with developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP-
countries). From the Lomé I agreement (signed in 1975) through the Lomé IV agreement (signed 
in 1989) to the current Cotonou Agreement (signed in 2000) these ACP-EU agreements
2 have all 
had as a primary objective to foster the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world 
economy. However, it bears stressing that the agreements have not been limited to 
understandings in the trade policy area, but have also included understandings covering 
cooperation and collaboration in areas as diverse as human development, migration, 
environment, emergency assistance, and foreign investment attraction.  
Among its trade provisions, the Lomé agreements granted ACP-countries unilateral 
preferential access to the EU market. This required waivers from the WTO since it implied 
discrimination against non-ACP developing countries—a contravention of the key Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) principle. WTO rules allow derogations from the MFN-principle for trade 
agreements where preferences are reciprocal and covering essentially all goods, or for unilateral 
market access privileges extended either to all developing countries or uniquely to least 
developed countries (LDCs). However, the ACP group includes only subsets of LDCs and 
developing countries.
3 
The Cotonou Agreement—covering ACP-EU collaboration over the 2000–20 period—
recognizes explicitly that the trading arrangements in the Lomé agreements were not WTO-
consistent, but notes the need to continue to maintain them during a transitory period while new 
                                                 
2 The signatory to these agreements is the European Community (EC) and not the European Union so strictly 
speaking these agreements should be refered to as ACP-EC agreements. As all EU member countries are also 
members of the EC the EU/EC distinction is of no economic significance and throughout this paper the more natural 
ACP-EU terminology is used.  
3 The modalities governing the establishment of derogations to the MFN-principle are laid out in Article XXIV of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, and Article 
IV of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. The Tokyo Round’s “Enabling 
Clause” provides the legal basis for developed countries’ granting of preferential market access to developing 
countries/least developing countries.   
2 
WTO-consistent trade agreements can be negotiated. The Cotonou agreement also includes a 
firm timetable for finalizing these WTO-consistent agreements by the end of 2007 to ensure that 
the new agreements can go into effect in January 2008. The timetable for completing WTO-
consistent trade agreements was subsequently endorsed by the WTO membership at its 2001 
ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar when the EU was granted a waiver of its WTO 
commitments with respect to the Cotonou agreement through 2007.  
The negotiations on WTO-consistent ACP-EU trade agreements—to be named Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPA)—are conducted in parallel with six different regional groupings 
(one for the Caribbean countries, one for the Pacific countries and four country groupings in 
Africa). The African groupings are centered around the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa, the Southern African Development Community, Central African Common 
Market as well as ECOWAS. Countries that are not members of a regional trade grouping may 
associate themselves with one of these groupings for the purpose of negotiating the new 
agreement. In West Africa, Mauritania has taken advantage of this possibility by joining the     
EU-ECOWAS negotiating group.  
While the scope of the EPAs is a matter for negotiation, the parties are aiming at broad 
framework agreements covering a wide range of areas of common economic interest as also 
suggested by the name chosen for the new type of agreement. Regardless of what form the EPAs 
will take, it is however clear that the core of the agreements must be a reciprocal free trade 
agreement between EU on the one hand and each of the six negotiating groups on the other hand 
which is the sine qua non of a WTO-consistent EPA. 
Among the challenges posed by the prospective ECOWAS-EU EPA is the need to 
consider fiscal implications and the appropriate sequencing of ECOWAS’ regional, EPA and 
global integration plans. Thus, completion of a fully functioning ECOWAS customs union prior 
to the enactment of the EPA would mitigate the chances of a hub-and-spokes pattern emerging in 
which trade with the EU is encouraged but intra-regional barriers prevent regional trade 
development within ECOWAS.
4 Preferential treatment for one large trading partner may also 
result in trade diversion from more efficient—but now higher-taxed—MFN sources of supply. 
Such trade diversion has a welfare cost for ECOWAS, but could be minimized if MFN tariffs are 
lowered in parallel with the introduction of preferences. Finally, the introduction of trade 
preferences, with attendant loss of customs revenues on imports both from EU and other 
ECOWAS trading partners, will require a fiscal response. The fiscal impact would be aggravated 
to the extent that imports are diverted from non-EU sources to the EU. Given the ECOWAS 
countries’ fragile economies, precarious fiscal positions, and enormous development needs, other 
sources of revenue may need to be mobilized to offset such revenue losses. 
                                                 
4 A customs union is not needed for the EPA per se as an ECOWAS free trade area coupled with liberal rules of 
origin and cumulation rules would suffice. However, ECOWAS decided to form a customs union long before the 
EPA negotiations commenced and the 2008 timetable for completion of the customs union is not formally linked to 
the timetable for completion of the EPA negotiations. The same argument applies to trade relations between the six 
trading groups that are negotiating separate EPAs with the EU. High MFN-barriers in a post-EPA environment 
would tend to encourage a world-wide hub and spoke system to the detriment of south-south trade prospects.  
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The paper is organized as follows. Following a brief discussion of ECOWAS’ 
achievements so far in regional economic integration, the paper provides estimates of import and 
fiscal revenue effects of major tariff reforms in Guinea and Nigeria in 2005 as well as the 
planned introduction of an ECOWAS customs union in 2008; these estimates are necessary 
building blocks before one can estimate the effects of the possible EPA but the estimates are also 
of interest in their own right. The paper then provides estimates of the import and fiscal revenue 
effects of an ECOWAS-EU EPA and compares and contrasts these estimates with other studies. 
The paper adds to the literature by incorporating explicitly the different tariff regimes in 
ECOWAS, conducting the analysis using more recent data on trade flows and fiscal revenue for 
selected ECOWAS countries, and by discussing factors that could mitigate revenue loss. 
II.   ECOWAS—ACHIEVEMENTS SO FAR AND CHALLENGES AHEAD 
Regional economic integration is never easy in the best of circumstances, and in West 
Africa integration has been pursued in extraordinarily difficult conditions. West African 
countries are among the poorest countries in the world and all have weak public institutions. 
Indeed, all but three countries—Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria—are LDCs. In addition, the 
region has suffered from a disproportionate number of devastating civil conflicts including in 
Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. All of these conflicts have had 
significant adverse repercussions across national borders, which in turn have set back progress 
towards achieving the economic integration of the region. 
Over the years ECOWAS’ membership has remained very stable with only one new 
country joining (Cape Verde in 1977) and one withdrawing (Mauritania in 2002). The current 
membership includes the following 15 countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde,  Cote 
d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, and Togo. The population in ECOWAS is more than 250 million, but its combined 
economy is only US$125 billion (Appendix Tables 1 and 2). Over the 1974-2004 period, the 
ECOWAS economy grew 3.2 percent annually (in nominal dollar terms), just slightly ahead of 
the  2.8 percent annual increase in population. Reflecting the poor economic performance, 
progress in achieving better social outcomes has also been limited. 
One should bear in mind that Nigerians constitute half of ECOWAS’ combined 
population and that ECOWAS-wide averages are dominated by developments in Nigeria. 
Against the background of stagnant oil production, the Nigerian economy has trailed economic 
developments elsewhere in the region and the share of the Nigerian economy in the total 
ECOWAS economy fell from two-thirds in 1974 to one half in 2004.
5 In contrast, vigorous 
economic growth in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mali and Senegal was 
significantly higher than in other ECOWAS countries.  
                                                 
5 The Nigerian share in 2004 would have been even smaller had it not been for relatively high oil prices in that year. 
In 2004—with crude oil production of 2.5 million barrels per day at an average export price ofUS$38 per barrel—
the share of oil/gas GDP in total GDP was close to 50 percent. In 1974—with crude oil production of 2.3 million 
barrels per day at an average export price of US$15 per barrel—the share of oil/gas GDP in total GDP was less than 
40 percent.   
4 
Progress towards regional integration was initially slow and uneven, but renewed 
momentum was provided by enactment of a revised ECOWAS treaty in July 1993. The revised 
treaty clarified the community’s economic objectives (establishment of a common market and a 
single currency) and facilitated the establishment of community-wide bodies such as a 
parliament, a social council, and court of justice. The 1993 treaty also formally assigned the 
Community the responsibility of preventing and solving regional conflicts.  ECOWAS has 
pursued a two-pronged integration agenda with broader political objectives being pursued in 
parallel with those relating to economic integration much along the lines of the European 
integration model. Arguably, ECOWAS has had greater results on the political front with well-
developed mechanisms for peace-keeping and conflict prevention and resolution standing out as 
notable achievements. With regard to economic integration, results have been slower in coming. 
An ECOWAS protocol on free movements of persons, the right of residence and establishment 
was agreed as early as in 1979, but compliance with the protocol’s provisions is spotty.
6 Free 
trade is also very limited in practice. 
In 1994 a subgroup of seven member countries—Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo—established the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU), which Guinea-Bissau joined in 1997. Already sharing a common currency—the 
CFA franc—with a regional central bank located in Dakar, Senegal these countries recognized 
that they could pursue sub-regional integration at a somewhat faster clip than what could be 
expected for the broader ECOWAS membership. By 1999 the WAEMU countries had adopted a 
regional pact of convergence, stability, growth, and solidarity aimed at strengthening economic 
performance through deeper regional integration and in 2000, a customs union was created with 
the elimination of tariffs on intra-WAEMU trade and establishment of a common external tariff 
(CET) on imports from outside the WAEMU area. 
With WAEMU countries already sharing a common currency, monetary cooperation 
among non-WAEMU countries (with the exception of Cape Verde and Liberia) takes place 
within the so-called Second Monetary Zone where the aim is to establish a common non-
WAEMU currency that is then subsequently merged with WAEMU’s CFA franc. As monetary 
unification requires macroeconomic stability, members of the Second Monetary Zone have 
committed to comply, inter alia, with various fiscal rules and limits on price and exchange rate 
volatility. In this area compliance has also remained spotty, and the timeline for introducing the 
common currency has been pushed back on several occasions (the last postponement shifted 
introduction of the common currency back from 2005 to December 2009). 
Establishment of a free trade area in goods among ECOWAS countries has been pursued 
within the framework of the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS). The ETLS breaks 
trade in goods into three categories: (1) unprocessed goods, (2) traditional handicraft products, 
and (3)  industrial goods.
7 The ETLS provided for the immediate and full liberalization of 
                                                 
6 For instance, so far only Benin and Senegal have issued ECOWAS passports. 
7 The TLP defines unprocessed goods as goods in Harmonized System (HS) chapters 1, 2, 4, 6-8,10, 13, 39, 40, 46, 
and 57, and parts of chapters 3, 9, 11, 12, 15, 18, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 31, 41, 44, 53, and 55. Traditional handicraft 
(continued…)  
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unprocessed and handicraft products, whereas industrial products were to have been gradually 
liberalized over the 1990–2000 period. In the event, implementing fully the TLP has proven 
elusive, but in 2003 ECOWAS adopted new rules of origin and a single customs declaration 
form, and simplified control procedures with a view towards reinvigorating the TLP (ECOWAS, 
2004). The main problem with the ECOWAS free trade area is trade in industrial goods, where 
approval has to be sought on a product-by-product and enterprise-by-enterprise basis. Although 
intra-ECOWAS trade in goods is still subject to many tariff and non-tariff restrictions (both 
official and unofficial), trade barriers are coming down and efforts are ongoing to make further 
progress towards achieving a unified internal market within ECOWAS.  
The region’s modest economic progress to date is also reflected in its export 
performance, where ECOWAS’ share of world exports now amounts to just 0.5 percent, down 
from 1.7 percent in the mid-1970s (Appendix Table 3). However, the share of intra-ECOWAS 
exports in total exports has tripled to 9  percent by 2004 from just 3 percent prior to the 
establishment of the ECOWAS. While this development does provide evidence of a deepening of 
commercial relations among member countries, trade relations deepened faster vis-à-vis other 
African countries (a quadrupling from 1 to 4 percent) and the increase in intra-ECOWAS trade 
may not have been  the result of the political quest for regional economic collaboration, but 
rather of technological  or other developments favoring trade. As expected, the closer economic 
integration (including monetary union) within the WAEMU has resulted in a higher level of 
regional trade for ECOWAS countries that are also members of WAEMU. In fact, the difference 
between WAEMU and non-WAEMU member countries in that regard is striking. In 2004, 14 
percent of WAEMU countries’ exports were destined to other WAEMU countries and an 
additional 10 percent destined to non-WAEMU ECOWAS partners. In contrast, only 5 percent 
of non-WAEMU countries’ exports were sold within ECOWAS.
8 
The landlocked nature and small economic size of most West African countries suggest 
the need for close regional collaboration on trade policy,
9 and ECOWAS provides an appropriate 
institutional setting in that regard. The markedly better economic performance in the subset of 
countries (WAEMU) that have pursued a more ambitious regional integration points to the 
benefits that can accrue as ECOWAS moves towards establishing an integrated regional market. 
The establishment of a customs union by 2008 is a key stepping stone in that process, and it is 
important that the timetable be adhered to regardless of whether the EPA negotiations will be 
successfully completed at the same time. 
                                                                                                                                                             
products are defined as goods in HS chapter 58 and parts of chapters 41-44, 55, 62, 64-67, 69, 74, 82, 83, 92, 93, and 
95–98. Remaining product categories are classified as industrial goods. 
8 Trade in crude oil and products derived from crude oil accounts for about half of all intra-ECOWAS trade, but oil 
trade plays a very limited role in trade among WAEMU countries and therefore does not explain the relative success 
of this agreement.  
9 One possible exception may be Cape Verde where its geographical location, state of development, and structure of 
production may suggest a free trade regime would yield greater benefits.   
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Besides establishment of an integrated internal market for goods and services free of 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers, the ECOWAS customs union project also requires its member 
countries to agree on a CET to be applied to imports from outside ECOWAS. In that latter 
regard, significant progress has already been made. It has been agreed to model ECOWAS’ CET 
on WAEMU’s CET that uses a four-band system of tariffs of 0, 5, 10, and 20 percent with an 
average unweighted tariff rate of 12 percent.  In recent years tariff reforms in non-WAEMU 
countries have aimed at harmonizing tariff rates with those prevailing in the WAEMU 
(Appendix Table 4). Until recently, Guinea and Nigeria were major outliers with a level of tariff 
protection of less than half (Guinea) or more than twice (Nigeria) that of other ECOWAS 
countries, but with major tariff reforms in these two countries in 2005 all ECOWAS countries 
have now broadly similar levels of tariff protection.
10 
III.   THE ROAD TO ESTABLISHING THE ECOWAS CUSTOMS UNION 
The establishment of the ECOWAS customs union is a multi-stage process, where the 
member countries first have to align their tariff schedules with each other, following which they 
eliminate remaining duties on intra-ECOWAS trade. 
The Nigerian 2005 tariff reform 
In a major break with past policies, Nigeria, in October 2005 liberalized its import 
regime. With this first major tariff reform in a decade, the level and dispersion of import tariff 
protection has fallen significantly.
1 The new tariff schedule reduces the number of tariff bands 
from 19 to 5, lowers average tariffs from 29 percent to 12 percent, and lowers maximum tariffs 
from 150 percent to 50 percent. 
The new tariff schedule is broadly in line with ECOWAS’ proposed common external 
tariff in that it clusters most tariffs in four bands of 0, 5, 10, and 20 percent with raw materials 
and intermediate products attracting lower tariffs and consumer goods attracting higher tariffs. 
An additional 50 percent tariff band has been introduced in order to provide selected items with 
additional protection for a transitional period. Products in the 50 percent band include rice, 
vegetable oils, sugar, tobacco, various plastics and steel products, vehicles, and selected 
electrical appliances. Agricultural tariffs have been lowered significantly more than other tariffs, 
but agriculture remains the most sheltered sector with average tariff protection in agriculture 
about 50 percent higher than that in industry (Table 1).  
                                                 
10 With the possible exception of Liberia, for which no information is available.  
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Table 1.  Nigeria: October 2005 Tariff Reform 
 Before  After 
Number of bands  19  5 
    
Unweighted average tariff (in percent)  28.6  12.1 
Of which:  Agricultural products  51.0  16.4 
Industrial products  24.8  11.4 
    
Minimum tariff (in percent)  2.5  0.0 
Maximum tariff (in percent)  150.0  50.0 
    
Standard deviation (in percent)  22.3  9.1 
    
The tariff reform lowered the tariff on cigarettes from 150 percent to 50 percent, but in 
order to maintain the pre-reform level of protection a new 100 percent levy on cigarette imports 
was introduced. In the case of rice, the tariff was lowered from 100 percent to 50 percent, but at 
the same time the import levy was increased from 10 percent to 50 percent. The border protection 
of rice production thus fell from 110 percent to 100 percent, but as the rice levy is earmarked for 
development of domestic production the effective protection in the rice sector may well have 
increased as a result of the tariff reform. 
The tariff reform lowered average weighted (unweighted) tariffs
11 from 21.3 percent 
(28.6  percent) to 9.7 percent (12.1 percent). The average tariff estimate does not reflect 
numerous bans on imports and is therefore an underestimate. 
The Nigerian tariff reform significantly lowered tariff-inclusive import prices. The lower 
import prices will in turn encourage higher imports, but what import elasticity is one to use to 
calculate the effect on imports? There are, unfortunately, no official or independent projections 
available on the reform’s expected effects. However, the tariff reform was an important 
component of the authorities’ policy package supported by the IMF through the recently 
approved Policy Support Instrument (PSI).  
The 2005 Guinean tariff reform 
Guinea’s adoption of the WAEMU tariff schedule led to a doubling of average 
(unweigthed) tariffs to 12 percent, but at the same time the additional import charge droit fiscal a 
l’entrée (DFE) was eliminated. The DFE was either a 6 percent or 8 percent charge, but no 
                                                 
11 The post-Uruguay Round tariff reform (March 1995) reduced average unweighted tariffs to 24 percent, but 
subsequent annual revisions to the schedule pushed the average rate up to 29 percent by end-2004. 
  
8 
information is available on its distribution across tariff lines. However, according to the WTO, 
the simple average of all tariffs and other duties and charges fell by 1.7 percentage points to    
14.9 percent as a result of the tariff reform.
12 This decrease in total protection would be 
consistent with an average DFE of 7.1 percent. It is therefore assumed that a uniform DFA of  
7.1 percent was abolished together with the adoption of the higher tariff schedule. It is assumed 
that the 1 percent decrease in average import prices has no appreciable effect on import levels, 
resulting in a nine percent decrease in import-related revenues.
13 
Adoption of the WAEMU CET 
  With Nigeria’s and Guinea’s 2005 tariff reforms the process of aligning the non-
WAEMU countries’ tariff schedules with those of WAEMU is almost complete. For most 
countries, fully adopting the WAEMU tariff schedule will therefore not lead to any further 
impact on aggregate non-oil imports or associated tariff revenues. 
 
IV.   THE PARAMETERS OF AN ECOWAS—EU ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 
The prospective ECOWAS-EU EPA does not have to include a complete and symmetric 
liberalization of all trade in order for the agreement to be considered WTO-consistent as WTO-
consistent PTAs only need to cover “substantially all trade” (GATT:  Article XXIV). What 
“substantial” means in practice is open for interpretation,and practice varies. For example, in The 
Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement between the EU and South Africa the EU 
provides duty-free access to virtually all imports from South Africa, which in return provides 
duty-free access for an estimated 86 percent of imports from the EU.  
Furthermore, implementation can take place over a “reasonable length of time” (GATT: 
Article XXIV). Here again it is open for interpretation what is to be considered “reasonable.” For 
example, the EU-South Africa agreement is being implemented over a twelve year period, as is a 
similar agreement between the EU and Tunisia. Neither of these agreements (nor any others) 
have been challenged in the WTO on these interpretations. Given that the EPA is slated to go 
into effect in 2008 and that the umbrella Cotonou Agreement runs through 2020, one may expect 
that the EPA will provide for a gradual implementation schedule over the 2008–20 period.  
                                                 
12 “Trade Policy Review: Guinea,” WTO, December 2005, page 32. 
13 The assumption of zero import price elasticity is inferred from the macroeconomic framework used in the IMF 
staff-monitored program, which incorporates a decrease in nominal dollar non-oil imports from 2004 to 2006 
(“Guinea—Staff Report for the 2005 Article IV Consultation and Staff-Monitored Program,” EBS/05/169, 
December 5, 2005).  However, in that program, the lower import taxes are expected to be associated with an 
increase in import-related fiscal revenues owing to improved policy effort (¶25 in EBS/05/169).  
9 
V.   ESTIMATES OF EPA TRADE AND FISCAL REVENUE EFFECTS:  
METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE 
There is an abundant literature analyzing the potential impact of regional trade 
agreements, of which an EPA is one example. Recent studies have analyzed the likely 
implications of EPA implementation for ECOWAS or Sub-Saharan Africa from various 
perspectives, in particular the opportunities and challenges from a development perspective 
(United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2004; Hinkle and  Schiff, 2004; Hinkle and 
Newfarmer, 2005), the trade and budget effects using a partial equilibrium model and/or a 
general equilibrium model (CAPE, 2002; Busse et al., 2004; UNECA, 2004), and the dynamic 
gains using a general equilibrium model (UNECA, 2004). 
While a general equilibrium model would be desirable to adequately capture the 
interactions between sectors and elasticities of substitutions, and to simulate dynamic effects in 
EPA, data availability and practical experience have induced many economists to use the partial 
equilibrium model as a second-best option.
14  
Much of the earlier analysis of the effects of trade agreements relies on Viner’s (1950) 
discussion of trade creation and trade diversion (Robinson et al., 2003). A partial equilibrium 
model can help estimate trade creation, trade diversion, and welfare effects, as well as fiscal 
revenue implications of trade policy changes. 
We assess the likely impact of EPA tariff changes on trade and the subsequent fiscal 
revenue changes, using a partial equilibrium model developed by Verdoorn, (1960), following 
Busse, Borrmann and Grossmann (2004). It is an import demand function which has also been 
used in previous studies with some variations (Testa, 1997; Laird and Yeats, 1986; UN- ECA, 
2004; Koranchelian, 2006).  
Verdoorn’s model, which is described in the Annex, is based on the normal assumptions 
of partial equilibrium analysis. Also, it is assumed that goods imported from different countries 
are imperfect substitutes ( “the Armington assumption”) and that the supply response to the price 
reduction, as a result of tariff reduction or elimination, will allow the EU producers and exporters 
to meet any demand arising in the importing countries as a result of price reduction. That is, EU 
export supplies are perfectly elastic. 
Trade creation captures the trade expanding aspects of liberalization that leads to the 
displacement of inefficient producers in a given preferential trading area. It is assumed that there 
is full transmission of price changes when tariff or non-tariff distortions are reduced or 
eliminated (Laird and Yeats, 1986; Ben Hammouda et al., 2004). That is, the domestic price of 
goods imported would change with the change in an ad valorem tariff. However, the price might 
                                                 
14 In some cases, a general equilibrium analysis can be usefully complemented with a partial equilibrium analysis as 
in the UN 2004 study on EU-ECOWAS EPA.  
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not fall as much as the tariff if markets are not very competitive, a common occurrence in small 
African states.  
Trade diversion as opposed to trade creation occurs when imports are diverted away 
from more efficient producers in non-preferred countries and toward less efficient producers in 
the free trade area. In the case of EU-ECOWAS, trade diversion would occur if as a result of the 
implementation of EPA (which implies free trade) more efficient suppliers from Non-EU trading 
partners into ECOWAS are displaced by inefficient producers from the EU.  
The estimate of the fiscal revenue effect of EPA using a partial equilibrium model is 
simple. The potential change in tariff revenue is equal to the sum of a reduction in tariff revenue 
collected on imports from the EU, which are facing a lower tariff (zero tariff rate under the 
EPA), and the loss of tariff revenue due to the substitution of EU imports (for which lower tariff 
are applied) for non EU imports and domestically— produced goods. 
Since a large share of ECOWAS imports originates in the EU and trade revenue 
constitutes a significant proportion of total revenue, there are concerns that the elimination of 
customs duties on most EU products in the context of the EPA could lead to a significant decline 
in government revenue (UNECA, 2004) and add an additional challenge to fiscal management. 
For nearly all ECOWAS countries, the EU is the single largest trading block. The share of the 
EU in total imports for each country of the region varies from about 29 percent for Niger to 
about 74 percent for Cape Verde. Duties on imports from the EU represent 10 to 15 percent of 
government revenue in Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria and Senegal; 15 to   
20 percent in Benin, Ghana, Guinea and Mali; 25 to 30 percent in Cape Verde, the Gambia, 
Niger and Sierra Leone, and more than 30 percent in Togo. 
A study by CAPE
15 (2002), commissioned by the WAEMU Commission, finds that, in 
the case of a complete trade liberalization vis-à-vis the EU, the members of UEMOA could 
encounter a decline in fiscal revenue ranging from US$3.2 million (1.6 percentof GDP) in 
Guinea Bissau to US$ 140.6 million (0.5 percent of GDP) in Ivory Coast. 
Busse, Borrmann and Grossmann (2004) also examined the (trade and) fiscal revenue 
effects of EPA on ECOWAS countries, using a partial equilibrium model. They find that, apart 
from  the impact on trade flows, the tariff elimination will lead to a decline in import duties and, 
hence, total government revenue. Their decline in fiscal revenue ranges from 0.71 percent of 
GDP in Burkina Faso to 4.1 percent of GDP in Cape Verde for the mean scenario
16. The 
projected decline in fiscal revenue is 1.2 percent of GDP for Nigeria, 1.8 percent of GDP for 
Ghana and 1.9 percent of GDP for Senegal. 
Using a CGE model for Nigeria, Adenikinju and Alaba (2005) find that a zero tariff on 
EU imports (as envisaged under the EPA) will lead to a decline in government revenue by 1 
                                                 
15 Cellule d’Analyse de Politique Economique, a research institute based in Benin. 
16 Using a price elasticity of 0.7 and elasticity of substitution of 2.  
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percent (0.4 percent of GDP
17), which includes a second round effect of the EPA, compared with 
2.5 percent (1.2 percent of GDP) in Busse et al.’s study (2004), which is based on the normal 
assumptions of partial equilibrium analysis. 
Our analysis focuses on the following four countries of ECOWAS: Nigeria, the single 
largest economy in the sub-region as well as the largest trading partner with the EU; Ghana,  
with the lowest tariff collection rate and a projected impact on government revenue exceeding  
10 percent according to previous studies; Senegal, with the highest tariff collection rate and a 
similarly significant impact on government revenue; and Cape Verde, with the highest impact as 
a share of government revenue. 
As outlined above, the implementation of the EPA could lead to a decline in tariff 
revenue through two channels. First, the (direct) revenue loss as a zero tariff rate will be applied 
to imports from countries in the free trade area (EU);  second, the (indirect) revenue loss arising 
from displacement of third country (non–EU) imports by countries in the free trade area (EU), 
following a tariff-induced reduction of prices. 
We assume complete trade liberalization at the initial stage of the EPA, as in previous 
studies, which is consistent with the short term perspective of a partial equilibrium model. 
Therefore, our results are likely to be upper limits of the estimates of the possible static and 
budget effects. We examine the impact of EPA implementation on trade and fiscal revenue under 
different assumptions regarding import demand and trade substitution elasticities, to test the 
results for sensitivity to underlying assumptions following Busse, Borrmann and Grossmann 
(2004). 
The base year for all estimations is 2004. Aggregate fiscal customs revenue data have 
been obtained from various IMF staff reports or directly from IMF desk officers.  
Finally, we assume that the EPA will be implemented under the current non- uniform 
external tariff in each ECOWAS member country. However, ECOWAS could well apply a 
common external tariff (CET) to imports before the implementation of EPA, if Nigeria carries 
out the implentation of its tariff reform in line with the ECOWAS CET and Ivory Coast recovers 
rapidly from the ongoing conflict. Under the assumption of a custom union
18 in ECOWAS, the 
EPA trade and tariff revenue effects of the EPA could be re-assessed, using an expanded partial 
equilibrium model (Appendix I). 
                                                 
17 Our calculations, to ensure comparability with other studies’ results. 
18 USAID (through ECOtrade Project) supported national impact studies of the ECOWAS CET in six countries. 
Studies were completed in 2004 for four countries: Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, in collaboration with 
the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, World Bank and other donors. It should be noted that many obstacles still 
impede effective implementation of free trade: absence of clear directives from national authorities in most member 
States; rules of origins; and other non-tariffs barriers, reflecting limited political commitment, a non-operational 
dispute settlement mechanism (community court of justice is not functional), inadequate compensation mechanism 
and limited capacity of regional institution to monitor and evaluate progress on the ground in each Member State 
(World Bank, 2004).   
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VI.   EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
As can be seen in the table below, we find that imports from the EU would increase in the 
range of 10.5 percent for Senegal to 11.5 percent for Nigeria, under a zero tariff / free trade 
scenario and assuming an elasticity of substitution of 2.0 and an import demand elasticity of 0.7. 
In absolute terms, trade diversion and trade creation in Nigeria are by far the largest, with 
US$ 417.8 million and US$ 486.1 million respectively, due to the magnitude of its total imports 
and the share of its imports from the EU. Trade creation (in absolute terms) is lower than trade 
diversion for Nigeria and Ghana, as imports from Non-EU countries make up a relatively large 
share of total imports, in contrast to Senegal and Cape Verde. 
Results of two other sets of simulations associated with lower (0.5) and higher (0.9) 
import demand elasticity
19 and with lower (1.3) and higher (2.5) elasticity of substitution showed 
no significant changes (Table 2). 
Table 2:  EU-ECOWAS Economic Partnership Agreement: 
trade and fiscal revenue effects 
    Nigeria  Ghana  Senegal 
Cape 
Verde 
Trade Effects          
I. Trade creation (million US $)  417.8  93.7  95.4  20.8 
           % of preferred imports (EU)  5.3%  5.1%  6.1%  6.6% 
II. Trade diversion (millions US $)  486.1  105.8  70.9  15.4 
          % of non-preferred imports  3.7%  3.7%  6.8%  9.0% 
III. Total Trade effects (million US $)  903.9  199.5  166.3  36.2 
         % of preferred imports (EU)  11.5%  10.9%  10.6%  11.4% 
            
Tariff Revenue Loss          
million US $      682.0  150.6  154.7  34.3 
% of Total  Government Revenue  2.4%  7.1%  10.4%  15.8% 
% of GDP        1.0%  1.7%  2.0%  3.6% 
Data source: IMF and World Bank, 2004         
Tariff revenue losses range from US$34.3 million in Cape Verde to US$150.6 million in Ghana, 
US$154.7 million in Senegal and US$682 million in Nigeria. 
 
As a share of total government revenue, the loss would be largest for Cape Verde (15.8 
percent) and Senegal (10.4 percent), because of their relatively large share of imports   from the 
EU and their higher dependence on tariff revenue.  Ghana would also be particularly affected 
with an estimated decline in government revenue of 7.1 percent, while the impact  would amount 
to 2.4 percent of government revenue in Nigeria. 
                                                 
19 Based on empirical work on trade elasticities (Olarreaga et al., 2004).  
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As a share of GDP, tariff revenue losses amount to 1.0 percent of GDP in Nigeria,1.7 
percent in Ghana, 2 percent in Senegal and 3.6 percent in Cape Verde.  
The EPA’s impact on total fiscal revenue is lower for Ghana and Cape Verde in our 
study, compared with Busse, Borrmann and Grossman’s
20 2004 study which is based on 2001 
data, because of differences in collected (applied) tariff rate, trade flow data (e.g. share of 
imports from EU) and total government revenue.
21 
In percent of GDP, the figures are similar to those of Busse et al. (1.0–2.0 percent of 
GDP) for Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal, in contrast to Cape Verde where the impact is lower by 
0.5 percentage points of GDP in our study. 
In comparison with our results, the trade and the budget effects of the EPA for Senegal
22, 
as projected by CAPE, are higher in percent of EU imports and in percent of GDP, as can be 
seen in Table 2. There are several reasons for these differences. The CAPE study applied 
different elasticities, performed the analysis at a more aggregated level and used a slightly 
different partial equilibrium model. In addition, CAPE used 2001 (unrevised) customs revenue 
figures (Busse et al, 2004) (Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Comparing the results of the IMF/ World Bank, Busse et al. and CAPE studies for Senegal 
    Our Study  Busse et al.    CAPE Study 
   (WB/IMF  data,  2004) 
(ECOWAS data, 
2001) (2001  data) 
           
Increase in total import 
from EU (%)  10.6%   11.5%   29.7% 
Tariff Revenue Loss          
           million US $  154.74    87.90    129.2 
          % of Total  
Government  Revenue  10.4%   10.7%   15.7% 
          % of GDP  2.0%     1.9%     2.8% 
 
The empirical analyses carried out in this paper show that the impact of implementing the 
EPA on fiscal revenue will be significant. However, fiscal revenue implications could be more 
limited for several reasons (discussed in the next section) and, thus, may be manageable. 
 
                                                 
20 We applied the same model used in Busse, Borrmann and Grossman‘s 2004 study and the same range of 
elasticities. However, we performed the analysis at an aggregate level, and used more recent trade flows and tariff 
revenue data. 
21  In Ghana for example, Government revenue increased from 18.5 percent of GDP in 2001 to 23.8 percent. For 
Nigeria, Government revenue averaged 46 percent of GDP in 2001 and 43.1 percent in 2004. 
22  The study, which  was commissioned by the UEMOA Commission, was limited to the group of eight UEMOA 
countries (Benin, Burkina faso, Guinea Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo).  
14 
VII.   MITIGATING THE REVENUE IMPACT OF INTEGRATION 
The likelihood of product exclusions 
First, using a partial equilibrium model, we assumed the abolishment of all tariffs on EU-
originating imports at the initial stage of the EPA. As discussed above, one should bear in mind 
that WTO consistency does not necessarily imply the complete and symmetric liberalization of 
all trade under the EPA. Certain products that may be sensitive from a fiscal or other perspective 
could be excluded from the agreement. As a result, the revenue loss would be lower than our 
estimates. 
The length of the implementation period 
Second, our estimates report the ultimate effect of a fully phased-in EPA. However, tariff 
elimination is most likely to take place gradually over 10 years or more, from January 2008 
(UNECA, 2004; Busse et al., 2004, Hinkle and Newfarmer, 2005) under the EPA timetable. 
Therefore, countries would have considerable time to introduce compensatory measures.  
Reform of exemptions regimes 
Third, in view of the large gap in some countries between the official tariff rate and the 
collected (applied) tariff rate (Table 4), tax yield could be improved through a reduction of tariff 
exemptions
23 and a modernization of customs administration.  
 




Import-weighted (official) tariff 
rate 
Cape Verde  12.1      15.4   
Ghana 4.7      16.2   
Nigeria 15.9      20.0   
Senegal 8.5      9.4   
ECOWAS (1)  8.0       12.2    
Source: Busse,  Borrmann and Grossmann, 2004    
(1) Unweighted averages for ECOWAS, excluding Liberia.   
 
While it is true that a proportion of exemptions is associated with categories that appear 
difficult to eliminate (for example, government, diplomatic and donor imports), experience 
shows that some revenue gains and minimization of fraud can be achieved with a tighter 
monitoring and control mechanisms (Tsikata, 1999). 
                                                 
23 Countries that make the most use of exemptions tend to be those with the highest tariff protection (Hood and 
Radack, 1998).  
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Domestic tax reform 
Fourth, to alleviate the fiscal effects of the EPA, countries could implement domestic tax 
reforms, in particular the VAT, with a view to increasing tax yield. Countries that have already 
implemented a VAT (for example Ghana, Cape Verde, Senegal and other WAEMU countries), 
and have little scope for increasing the revenues from it, could consider strengthening other 
components of their tax and revenue systems (Hinkle and Newfarmer, 2005; Doe, 2006). There 
are precedents for successful replacement of tariff revenue losses even in weak administrative 
environments. 
Trade-induced growth 
Fifth, our estimates of the impact of the EPA on government revenue excluded growth 
effects. Potential higher economic growth rates from the full implementation of the EPA would 
lead to an increase in imports from EU and non-EU countries, and generate additional tariff and 
domestic tax revenues. This revenue-enhancing effect of trade-induced growth could be captured 
in the analysis. 
Compensatory mechanisms 
Finally, since the EPA studies show large country-by-country differences in fiscal 
revenue loss, ECOWAS could make more operational its compensatory mechanism among 
ECOWAS members to redistribute gains and losses in the context of the EPA, building on the 
experience of WAEMU countries which established in 1999 a mechanism for compensations for 
tariff revenue losses suffered because of the elimination of customs duties on intra-WAEMU 
trade
24.  
VIII.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The first three decades of ECOWAS’ existence was a turbulent political period for most 
of its members as stagnant economic output left social aspirations unfulfilled. In these trying 
circumstances, it was difficult to maintain meaningful momentum towards regional integration 
with the lack of regional integration in turn failing to provide much support to member countries’ 
economic development. After many false starts over the years, the ECOWAS member countries 
are currently engaged in an ambitious push towards significantly deeper integration.  
                                                 
24 The WAEMU commission (the administrative body of the Union) collected 85 billion CFA (130 million Euros) 
over 2001-2003 period, using a community solidarity tax of 1 percent, which is levied on all taxable imports. 
Compensation for shortfall of customs revenues only concerned the import of industrial products originating from 
WAEMU and was conditioned on the effective and full implementation of the common external tariff, certified by 
the Commission.  61 percent of the proceeds from PCS went for the compensation fund, 25 percent to the budget of 




The empirical analyses carried out in this paper show that the impact of implementing 
EPA on fiscal revenue for selected ECOWAS countries will be significant. We find that imports 
from the EU would increase in the range of 10.5 percent for Senegal to 11.5 percent for Nigeria, 
under a zero tariff / free trade scenario. As a share of total government revenue, revenue loss 
would be largest for Cape Verde (15.8 percent) and Senegal (10.4 percent), because of their 
relatively large share of imports from the EU and their higher dependence on tariff revenue. 
Ghana would also be significantly affected with an estimated decline in government revenue of 
7.1 percent, while the impact would amount to only 2.4 percent of government revenue in 
Nigeria. As a share of GDP, tariff revenue losses amount to 1.0 percent of GDP in Nigeria, 1.7 
percent in Ghana, 2.0 percent in Senegal and 3.6 percent in Cape Verde. 
However, the fiscal revenue losses may be manageable because of several mitigating 
factors, in particular the likelihood of product exclusions, the length of the EPA implementation 
period, the scope for reform of exemptions regimes, domestic tax reform, and the revenue-
enhancing effect of trade-induced growth. Consideration might also be given to compensatory 
mechanisms.  
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APPENDIX I: VERDOORN’S MODEL 
Following the approach taken by Busse, et al (2004), Verdoorn’s model (1960) can be derived as 
follows:  
 
 (C1)  prw peu M rw Meu
ελ εα β = +   Where  Peu  and  Prw are the average prices of import from 
EU and the Rest of World (that is non preferred countries) respectively, α  and λ  are 
share coefficients.  
 





 (C3) α  +  λ  = 1 
 
β  is a parameter andε , the elasticity of import demand. 
 
The elasticity of substitution σ  of preferred (EU) and non preferred (Rest of the World) imports 














In case of preferential tariff elimination, only  Peu  changes. If we differentiate (C4), divide by (C4) 
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If we differentiate (C1) and divide by (C1): 
 
(C6)  δα ε
δ












Next, we use definitions of α   and λ  in (C6), we obtain: 
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Next, we eliminate  
M rw
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Inserting (C10) in (C7) and substituting  α Δ  using (C8), we get: 
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Since (log P) is close to zero if Prw Peu ≈ , (C11) can be rewritten as: 
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Prices for preferred imports (from EU) can be rewritten as: 
 
(C13)   ) 1 ( t Px Peu + =  
 
Where  Pxis the export price excluding tariff t. taking the total derivative of (c13), we get: 
(C14)  t Px t Px peu δ δ δ + + = ) 1 (  
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Finally, separating (C17) into trade creation (TC) and Trade diversion (TD), we obtain: 
 

















ε σ λ   
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This total change in EU import, Qeu δ , is the sum of trade creation (TC) and trade diversion (TD). 
Trade creation is the change in imports from EU due to lower prices following the reduction of 
tariff; trade diversion is the substitution of EU imports for non EU imports and domestically 
produced goods due to preferential tariff. 
 



















ε σ λ  
 
2.  Fiscal implications: an extended quantitative framework 
 
The potential change in tariff revenue is equal to the sum of a reduction in tariff revenue 
collected on import from EU,M eu, which are facing a lower tariff and the loss of tariff revenue 
due to the substitution of EU imports (for which lower tariff are applied) for non EU imports and 
domestically produced goods. 
 
(C21) Qij Mij = ,  
Mij  is import (value) from trading partner /bloc j in time period i 
 
Subscript j, stands for trade partners (EU, European Union and RW, the rest of the world) 
 
(C22)  Qo Mo . =  
(C23)  Q M . 1 1=  
              =  M rw 1 + M eu 1  
 
               =  () ) ( ) ( TD TC Moeu TD Morw + + + −  
 
(C24)   M to o Ro =  
 
(C25)   M t R 1 1 1=  
 
Tariff revenue loss  is the sum ( R δ ) of tariff loss on pre EPA import from EU, tariff revenue loss 
due to trade diversion and  t eu TC 1 , tariff revenue increases as a result of trade creation.  
 (C26)   ≡ R δ Ro R − 1  
                 = [ M t j j 1 1 ]-[ M toj oj ] 
                  = [ M trw rw 1 1 ]+[ M t eu eu 1 1 ]-[ Mo to ]    
                 =  () [] ) ( 1 ) ( 1 TD TC Moeu teu TD Morw trw + + + − -[ Mo to ];  
                 =  () [] ) ( 1 1 TD TC Moeu t eu TD Morw t rw + + + − -[ M to orw+ M to oeu ] 
                 =   TD t rw M t rw orw 1 1 − +  TD eu TC t eu Moeu t eu t1 1 1 + +  -  Morw to - Moeu to   
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                 =  M to t rw orw
) ( 1 − +[ M to t eu oeu ) 1 ( −  +  TD t rw t eu ) 1 1 ( − +  TC t eu 1  ]         
where tij  represents tariff on import from trading bloc j in time period i 
(C27)  to t rw = 1   0 1 = − ⇒ to t rw ,   0 ) ( 1 = − M to t rw orw  
 
         to t eu p 1   0 1 p to t eu − ⇒ ,   0 ) 1 ( p M to t eu oeu −  
 
         t rw t eu 1 1 p   0 1 1 p t rw t eu− ⇒ ,   0 ) 1 1 ( p TD t rw t eu −  
 
          0 1 ≥ t eu ,    0 1 ≥ ⇒ TC t eu  
 
2.2 Tariff Revenue Loss 
 
2.2.1 Scenario 1- Zero percent tariff on all imports from EU. 
 
We know that tariff rates on imports from the rest of the world do not change. If we assume that 
the tariff on imports from EU under EPA is zero, then tariff revenue loss equals (using equation 
15): 
(C28)   R δ =   M to oeu  +  TD t rw 1  - 0 % TC
25  
where ( M to oeu ) is tariff revenue loss excluding trade diversion and trade creation effects. 
          ( TD t rw 1 ) represents tariff revenue loss due to trade diversion 
 
This result is consistent with a comparison of pre-EPA/status quo tariff revenue with that of post 
EPA tariff revenue in the case tariff is set equal to zero. Given that the new tariff on EU import 
under EPA is zero, the potential tariff revenue gains on trade creation,  TC t eu 1 , which could have 
partially offset tariff revenue loss, does not materialize
26.  
 
2.2.2 Scenario 2- Preferential non –zero average
27  tariff on imports from EU. 
 
Assume now that preferential tariff t eu 1 on EU import is lower than tariff t rw 1 on import from the 
Rest of the World and t 0 ≠  (  to torw t rw teu = = < < 1 0 ), and since tariff on import from the rest of the 
world does not change ( t rw to 1 = ) as mentioned before, the expected change in tariff revenue 
with regard to expected post EPA trade level can be expressed as: 
(C29)  R δ =    M to t eu oeu ) 1 ( −  +  TD t rw t eu ) 1 1 ( − +  TC t eu 1                   
                             (-)                       (-)                 (+) 
                                                 
25  We left TC * 0 % on the right-hand side of the equation only for clarity of exposition. 
26 That is, if t eu 1  is set equal to zero,  t TC eu 1 =0 in equation (15).  




  M to t eu oeu ) 1 ( −   represents tariff revenue loss on pre EPA import from EU 
  TD t rw t eu ) 1 1 ( − , tariff revenue loss due to trade diversion  
and  TC t eu 1 , tariff revenue increases as a result of trade creation. 
 
For the empirical estimation of expected changes in tariff revenue, t stands for tariff (excluding 
any other charges applicable to imports) collected as percentage of c.i.f. value of imports by 
products. Comparing to statutory (official) rate, it highlights in particular the coverage of import 




APPENDIX II: ECOWAS: EPA trade and fiscal effects 
        Our Study        Busse, Borrmann and  Grossmann   
            (World Bank/ IMF  data, 2004)        (ECOWAS data, 2001)    
Trade Effects    Nigeria  Ghana  Senegal Cape  Verde   Nigeria Ghana Senegal Cape  Verde 
Collected tariff rate    8.22%  7.88%  9.5%  10.3%    15.90%  4.70%  8.50%  12.10% 
                      
EU import in % of total import  37.3%  39.2% 60.0%  74.1%   47.9%  43.1%  51.8%  74.3% 
                      
                      
Change in prices after elimination  -7.6%  -7.3%  -8.7%  -9.4%    13.7%  4.5%  7.8%  10.8% 
 of tariff on EU Import                     
                      
I. Trade creation                     
million US $      417.8  93.7  95.4  20.8    348.3  45.6  71.2  16.9 
% of preferred imports    5.3%  5.1%  6.1%  6.6%    12.5%  3.7%  8.0%  9.2% 
                      
II. Trade diversion                     
million US $      486.1  105.8  70.9  15.4    229.1  40.2  31.4  4.5 
% of non-preferred imports (Non EU)  3.7%  3.7%  6.8%  9.0%    7.6%  2.4%  3.8%  7.1% 
                      
III. Total Trade effects                     
million US $      903.9  199.5  166.3  36.2    577.4  85.9  102.7  21.5 
% of preferred imports    11.5%  10.9%  10.6%  11.4%    20.8%  6.9%  11.5%  11.7% 
                      
Tariff Revenue Loss                  
million US $      682.0  150.6  154.7  34.3    487.8  90.8  87.9  24.0 
% of Total  Tariff Revenue    41.48%  47.4%  69.6%  78.0%    52.7%  66.4%  60.0%  79.9% 
% of Total  Government Revenue  2.4%  7.1%  10.4%  15.8%    2.5%  10.3%  10.7%  19.8% 
% of GDP        1.0%  1.7%  2.0%  3.6%     1.2%  1.8%  1.9%  4.1%  
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Appendix Table 1. ECOWAS Countries' Gross Domestic Product 
(In units indicated) 
 
Level  (in billion 
dollars)   




Per capita (in current 
dollars) 
   1974  2004     1974  2004 
percent 
change 1974  2004 
              
Total 48.0  124.7    100.0 100.0  3.2  431  490 
Benin 0.4  4.0    0.9 3.2  7.6  143  494 
Burkina Faso  0.5  5.1   1.1 4.1  7.8 93  399 
Cape Verde  0.1  0.9   0.2  0.7  7.7  366  1,877 
Cote d'Ivoire  3.1  16.0   6.4  12.9  5.7  487  897 
Gambia, The  0.1  1.9   0.2  1.6  10.6  177  1,317 
Ghana 4.1  8.9    8.5  7.1  2.6  409  409 
Guinea 3.9  4.0    8.1  3.2  0.1  940  440 
Guinea-Bissau 0.6  0.3   1.2  0.2  -2.5  905  176 
Liberia 0.5  0.5    1.1  0.4  -0.1  326  152 
Mali 0.4  4.8    0.8 3.9  8.6 67  368 
Niger 0.7  3.0    1.4 2.4  5.2  128  225 
Nigeria 31.1  64.4    64.8 51.6  2.5 542  500 
Senegal 1.4  7.6    2.9 6.1  5.8  276  669 
Sierra Leone  0.6  1.1   1.2  0.9  2.2  193  201 
Togo 0.5  2.0    1.1 1.6  4.5  227  339 
              
Memorandum  items:              
              
WAEMU countries 1/  7.7  43.0   15.9  34.5  5.9  221 509 
Non-WAEMU countries 2/  40.4 81.7    84.1 65.5  2.4 526  480 
                          
              
Sources: International Financial Statistics, WEO; and staff estimates.         
               
1/ Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo       




Appendix Table 2. ECOWAS Countries' Demographic and Social Indicators 
(In units indicated) 
  Population Illiteracy  rate 
  Level (in millions)   




(in percent of adult 
population) 
   1974  2004     1974  2004 
percent 
change  1974 2004 
              
Total 111.4  254.5    100.0  100.0  2.8 77 45 
Benin 3.1  8.2    2.8 3.2  3.3 86 60 
Burkina Faso  5.8  12.8    5.2 5.0  2.7 92 87 
Cape Verde  0.3  0.5    0.2 0.2  2.0 57 24 
Cote d'Ivoire  6.3  17.9    5.7 7.0  3.5 76 52 
Gambia, The  0.5  1.5    0.5  0.6  3.4 n/a n/a 
Ghana  10.0  21.7    9.0 8.5  2.6 65 26 
Guinea 4.2  9.2    3.7  3.6  2.7 n/a n/a 
Guinea-Bissau 0.6  1.5    0.6  0.6  3.0 n/a n/a 
Liberia 1.6  3.2    1.4 1.3  2.5 78 44 
Mali 6.1  13.1    5.4 5.2  2.6 89 81 
Niger 5.2  13.5    4.6 5.3  3.3 93 83 
Nigeria 57.3  128.7    51.5  50.6  2.7 75 33 
Senegal 5.1  11.4    4.6 4.5  2.7 83 61 
Sierra Leone  2.9  5.3    2.6  2.1  2.1 n/a n/a 
Togo 2.4  6.0    2.1 2.4  3.1 74 40 
             
Memorandum  items:             
             
WAEMU countries 1/  34.6  84.4    31.1  33.2  3.0 85 68 
Non-WAEMU countries 2/  76.8  170.1    68.9  66.8  2.7 74 32 
                          
Sources: International Financial Statistics, World Economic Outlook, World Bank Indicators; and staff estimates.     
              
1/ Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo       
2/ Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone         
3/  1996.              
4/  1992.               
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Appendix Table 3. ECOWAS Countries' Merchandise Exports 
(In units indicated) 
  Level  (in million dollars)    Share (in percent of total)  Average annual  Direction of Exports in 1974 (in percent) 1/   
  1974  2004    1974  2004  percent change  ECOWAS  Other Africa  ROW    
                 
Total 12,630  46,991  100.0  100.0 4.5 3.1  0.9  96.0   
Benin 34  349  0.3  0.7  8.1 19.9 1.0  79.0   
Burkina Faso  36  371  0.3  0.8 8.0  47.2  0.2  52.7 
Cape Verde  2  21  0.0  0.0 8.3 6.7  20.0  73.3   
Cote d'Ivoire  1,213  6,545  9.6 13.9  5.8  9.4  3.9  86.7   
Gambia 39  37  0.3  0.1  -0.2 1.7  0.0  98.3   
Ghana 729  2,268  5.8  4.8  3.9 0.7  0.5  98.7   
Guinea 112  560  0.9  1.2  5.5 0.1  7.8  92.1   
Guinea-Bissau 3  115  0.0  0.2 13.1  1.4 1.9  96.7   
Liberia 400  959  3.2  2.0  3.0 0.9  0.3  98.9   
Mali 64  327  0.5  0.7  5.6 32.1 3.9  64.0   
Niger 53  222  0.4  0.5  4.9 33.4 0.3  66.3   
Nigeria 9,219  33,209  73.0  70.7 4.4 1.8  0.2  98.1   
Senegal 391  1,269  3.1  2.7 4.0  10.3  7.2  82.5   
Sierra Leone  146  185  1.2  0.4 0.8 2.0  0.0  98.0   
Togo 188  554  1.5  1.2  3.7 2.3  0.3  97.4   
                 
Memorandum  items:                 
                 
WAEMU countries 2/  1,982  9,752  15.7 20.8  5.5  11.1 4.0  84.8   
Non-WAEMU countries 3/  10,648  37,239 84.3  79.2  4.3  1.6 0.3  98.1   
                 
World exports  746,464 
9,113,
972 …  …  8.7  1.7  3.3  95.0   
                                
Sources: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, World Economic Outlook database; and staff estimates.         
                    
1/ For Cape Verde and Guinea 1976 and 1981 respectively.               
2/ Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo           
3/ Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone            
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Appendix Table 4. ECOWAS countries' Bound and Applied tariff rates in 2004 
(In percent) 
  WTO bound tariffs    Applied tariffs 
   Minimum  Maximum  Average     Minimum  Maximum  Average 
Total 1/  20  88  54    0  43  13 
Benin 0  100  30    0  20  12 
Burkina Faso  0  100  46    0  20  12 
Cape Verde 2/  ...  ...  ...    0  123  10 
Cote d'Ivoire  0  25  11    0  20  12 
Gambia 20  110  106    0  18  13 
Ghana 30  99  95    0  110  13 
Guinea 0  40  21    0  7  6 
Guinea-Bissau 40  50  49    0  20  12 
Liberia 2/  ...  ...  ...    ...  ...  ... 
Mali 0  75  30    0  20  12 
Niger 0  200  41    0  20  12 
Nigeria 40  150  117    3  150  29 
Senegal 15  30  30    0  20  12 
Sierra Leone  30  80  47    0  30  14 
Togo 80  80  80    0  20  12 
              
Memorandum items:               
              
WAEMU countries 1/ 3/  17  83  39    0  20  12 
Non-WAEMU countries 1/ 4/  24  96  77    1  63  15 
Nigeria (after 2005 tariff reform)        0  50  12 
Guinea (after 2005 tariff reform)        0  20  12 
Non-WAEMU countries (after 2005 tariff reforms) 1/ 4/      0  46  13 
                       
Sources: IMF Trade Policy Division's databases; and staff estimates.        
1/Unweighted average.                
2/ Not a member of WTO.               
3/ Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo     
4/ Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone 
NB: The average tariff estimate  does not reflect the bans on imports and is therefore an underestimate, especially for Nigeria.     